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INSTALLMENT LAND CONTRACTS IN PURCHASER
BANKRUPTCY
ABSTRACT
The executory contract analysis under § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code has
long challenged judges, practitioners, and scholars. The challenge of
understanding the purpose of § 365 and reaching an equitable result thereafter
is most profound when confronting installment land contracts. The parties to
an installment land contract, typically the purchaser, can become insolvent and
enter bankruptcy, and consequently, the rights of the parties may be altered
dramatically as a result of applying bankruptcy law. The express provisions of
§ 365 have provided some clarity for the rights of the parties in seller
bankruptcy. In the case of purchaser bankruptcy, however, the language of the
Bankruptcy Code is not much help, and courts have devised inconsistent ways
to characterize installment land contracts.
This Comment argues that an installment land contract should be presumed
a mortgage in purchaser bankruptcy. When analyzing installment land
contracts in purchaser bankruptcy, courts have asked whether the contract is an
“executory contract” under § 365. However, this inquiry has resulted in
distortion of the parties’ property rights and inconsistent applications of
bankruptcy law by courts, and has illustrated the lack of utility of § 365 for
installment land contract purchasers. The proper question to ask is whether an
installment land contract functions like a security device, to which § 365 is
inapplicable. When asking this question and considering the benefit to the
estate and equitable outcome, courts should presume that an installment land
contract is a mortgage. The mortgage presumption, however, may be rebutted
if the installment land contract does not function like a mortgage or if there are
other equitable considerations against the presumption. The rebuttable
mortgage presumption would preserve the purchaser’s property rights while
retaining installment land contracts as a viable real estate device.
INTRODUCTION
The executory contract analysis under § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code
(Code) has long been challenging to judges, practitioners, and scholars. The
challenge of understanding the purpose of § 365 and reaching an equitable
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result thereafter is most profound when the law confronts installment land
contracts. The parties to an installment land contract, typically the purchaser,
can become insolvent and enter into bankruptcy, and the rights of the parties
may be altered dramatically as a result of applying bankruptcy law.
Historically, inequity resulted from seller bankruptcies under the Bankruptcy
Act of 1938 where the seller could reject the installment land contract and
force the purchaser to lose the property and his past payments.1 The express
provisions in § 365 have provided some clarity for the rights of the parties in
seller bankruptcy.2 In the case of purchaser bankruptcy, however, the language
of the Code is not much help, and courts have devised inconsistent ways to
characterize installment land contracts.
An installment land contract should be presumed to be a mortgage in
purchaser bankruptcy because applying § 365 would ignore the purchaser’s
property rights and would not provide any benefit to the estate. While state
laws may allow installment land contracts to occupy an ambiguous place in
between other real estate devices, such as mortgages or leases, the parties’
rights have to be clearly categorized into either contractual rights or property
rights in bankruptcy law.3 Because of the Code’s dichotomous treatment of
contracts and secured properties,4 the rights of the seller and purchaser of an
installment land contract are inevitably skewed in purchaser bankruptcy. Two
key issues that arise in purchaser bankruptcy are (1) whether a court should
focus on contract law or property law by default in treating an installment land
contract; and (2) whether the court should ultimately characterize the
installment land contract primarily as a contract or a security device. This
Comment explores the inconsistent treatment of installment land contracts in
purchaser bankruptcy, discusses the inequities resulting from the executory
contract treatment, and proposes that a rebuttable mortgage presumption would
preserve the purchaser’s property rights and benefit the estate while retaining
installment land contracts as a viable real estate device.

1

See generally Frank R. Lacy, Land Sale Contracts in Bankruptcy, 21 UCLA L. REV. 477 (1973).
11 U.S.C. § 365(i), (j) (2006). The Code also has special provisions for lessees and licensees who,
similar to purchasers in seller bankruptcy, are the non-debtor parties that have been relying on the now
bankrupt lessors or licensors respectively. Id. § 365(h), (n). These provisions mitigate the inequitable
consequences of bankruptcy by reducing the power of the trustee in bankruptcy under § 365.
3 See generally Mitchell R. Julis, Classifying Rights and Interests under the Bankruptcy Code, 55 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 223 (1981).
4 See generally id.
2
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Part I discusses the nature of installment land contracts, the relevant Code
provisions, and the judicial treatment of installment land contracts in various
jurisdictions. Part II examines why applying § 365 to installment land contracts
results in incoherent state property rights, especially in light of the true lease
jurisprudence. This Part instead suggests a better approach would be for courts
to presume that installment land contracts are mortgages. Part III discusses the
functionality and equity considerations behind a possible rebuttal of the
mortgage presumption of installment land contracts in purchaser bankruptcy.
I. BACKGROUND ON INSTALLMENT LAND CONTRACTS AND EXECUTORY
CONTRACTS IN BANKRUPTCY
The most common way to purchase property is to obtain conventional longterm financing and convey to the lender a security interest in the property.5 In
this context, applicable state mortgage law provides the rights of the parties
and the procedures in case of default.6 Unfortunately, some buyers are not able
to make the large down payments that may be required for conventional
financing. Sellers may find state mortgage laws unattractive—perhaps due to
the state’s expensive foreclosure process. Instead of entering into a purchase
money mortgage arrangement governed by state mortgage law, the purchaser
and the seller may enter into a contract for selling the property for monthly
installment payments over a decade or more.7 The simplicity of this
instrument, commonly referred to as an installment land contract, has attracted
purchasers (vendees) and sellers (vendors) for different reasons. State courts
have struggled to characterize installment land contracts in a manner consistent
with their respective property laws.8
This Part will first explore the ambiguous nature of installment land
contracts and various states’ enforcement of installment land contracts. Then, it
will discuss the applicable Code provisions for installment land contracts and
how federal courts have treated installment land contracts in purchaser
bankruptcy.

5

See BAXTER DUNAWAY, 1 THE LAW OF DISTRESSED REAL ESTATE § 1.3 (2012).
See id.; infra text accompanying notes 21–22, 44–46.
7 15 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 84D.01[1] (Michael Allan Wolf ed. 2009).
8 See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 3.38 (5th ed. 2010),
available at Westlaw, 1 REALFNLAW § 3.38.
6
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A. The Nature of Installment Land Contracts
Installment land contracts incorporate a combination of contract and
property principles, and state courts and legislatures have often confronted
difficulties characterizing them.9 Typically, the seller under an installment land
contract—also called a “contract for deed” or “land sale contract”—receives
monthly installments of the sale price of the property usually for over a decade
or more from the purchaser.10 The purchaser may take immediate possession of
the property once the contract period starts.11 Often the contract is not
recorded, and the seller retains full legal title against the purchaser until the
very end of the contract’s term.12 Under the strict terms of the contract, the
purchaser does not have any present or future interest in property, except for
the current possession, until the full payment of the contract price. Therefore,
the seller’s title is not defeasible by the purchaser during the contract period or
before full payment.13 Nonetheless, the purchaser usually pays taxes on the
property and maintains the property as if he is the owner.14
A unique feature of an installment land contract is the forfeiture clause.15
The forfeiture clause usually provides that upon default of the purchaser, the
seller as the title holder can repossess the property and keep the purchaser’s
past payments as liquidated damages.16 Although judicial and legislative
responses in various states have greatly reduced the potency of the forfeiture
clause, several states still enforce some versions of forfeiture.17 Installment
land contracts provide greater protection for the sellers with this possibility of
forfeiture. The enhanced seller protection of installment land contracts allows
9 See id. §§ 3.27, 3.33 (discussing state courts and legislatures characterizing installment land contracts
as a mortgage); Eric T. Freyfogle, Vagueness and the Rule of Law: Reconsidering Installment Land Contract
Forfeitures, 1988 DUKE L.J. 609, 613–14 (noting that some courts are deciding installment land contracts are
mortgage-equivalents while others are not making such analogy). Courts also have made a distinction between
installment land contracts and earnest money contracts. Id. at 630.
10 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 3.26; see also Jacob Rabkin & Mark H. Johnson, 25-21 CURRENT
LEGAL FORMS WITH TAX ANALYSIS, form 21.19 (providing a sample installment land contract for residential
property).
11 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 3.26; see also Jacob Rabkin & Mark H. Johnson, 25-21
CURRENT LEGAL FORMS WITH TAX ANALYSIS, form 21.19.
12 15 POWELL, supra note 7, §§ 84D.01[1], 84D.02[1].
13 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8 §§ 3.26, 3.33. If the installment land contract allows prepayment,
the purchaser may end the contract term early and advance the conveyance of title.
14 Id. § 3.26; see also Rabkin & Johnson, supra note 11, form 21.19 (providing a sample installment land
contract for residential property).
15 See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, §3.27.
16 Id. § 3.26.
17 15 POWELL, supra note 7, § 84D.03[1].
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risk-averse sellers to enter into a contract with financially challenged potential
buyers.18 An installment land contract is similar to a purchase money mortgage
where the purchaser pays monthly installments over many years eventually to
own the property.19 The purchasers who cannot obtain traditional mortgages
because of their financial status can utilize the installment land contract to have
a “mortgage” in effect.20
One possible reason why the sellers and buyers enter into installment land
contracts is the characteristics of the state mortgage law.21 Because of the
prevailing understanding that an installment land contract is a pro-seller
device, one may explain its popularity in pro-mortgagor states where the only
recourse for a mortgagee is judicial foreclosure.22 Although some argue that
installment land contracts should be abolished as more states allow power-ofsale foreclosures, installment land contracts still serve the purpose of providing
low-income buyers a means to finance property in jurisdictions where sellers
believe the risk involved in a mortgage with low-income buyers is too high.23
These circumstances that typically accompany the use of installment land
contracts raise important equity concerns in bankruptcy.24
The best way to understand the rights of the seller and the purchaser in an
installment land contract is to compare their respective rights to those of the
parties in transactions structured using other devices, such as a short-term
earnest money contract, mortgage, and lease. An installment land contract may
share some similarities with each instrument but is not completely identical to
any.25
1. Installment Land Contract Versus Earnest Money Contract, Mortgage,
and Lease: Comparison with Respect to the Parties’ Relative Property
Rights
There are practical and functional considerations as to why an installment
land contract seems to straddle the relatively definite lines marked by different
18

Id.
Id. § 84D.01[1].
20 Id. (quoting Ellis v. Butterfield, 570 P.2d 1334, 1336 (Idaho 1977), which calls an installment land
contract a “poor man’s mortgage”).
21 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 3.38.
22 Id.
23 Id. (discussing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. (MORTGAGES) § 3.4, cmt. d (1997)).
24 See discussion infra Part II.B.4.
25 See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 3.26; 15 POWELL, supra note 7, § 84D.01[1].
19
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devices. An installment land contract, as a “sale,” is a transaction in form
similar to an earnest money contract.26 However, the transaction incorporates
property rights that are found in mortgage or lease arrangements.27 There are
several aspects of an installment land contract that assist the understanding of
how it compares to other devices: the payment arrangements, duration of
contract, possession of property, control of property, and eventual ownership.
Although it is difficult to determine what exactly an installment land contract
purchaser has, the purchaser’s rights to the property are somewhere between a
mortgagor’s property rights and a lessee’s property rights.28 The control of
property during the term of the contract and the eventual conveyance of title
suggest that the purchaser’s rights lie closer to the mortgagor’s rights than to
the lessee’s rights.29
In form, an installment land contract may mimic an earnest money contract,
but in substance, an installment land contract is not comparable to an earnest
money contract. An earnest money contract is a short-term contract for the sale
of real property in which there is no a transfer of possession before the closing
and delivery of title.30 The primary purpose of an earnest money contract is to
convey title and ownership of the property in exchange for a lump sum or a
few series of payments; the purchaser becomes the owner of the property when
the transaction closes (usually within a couple of months).31 An earnest money
contract stipulates the rights of the parties during the term of the contract as the
payments are made and the title is delivered.32 Similarly, an installment land
contract stipulates the rights of the seller and the purchaser during the
installment payment period.33 Strictly adhering to the installment land
contract’s terms, the purchaser has no right to title to or equity in the property
before full payment.34 Although an installment land contract may seem like an
26

See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 3.26; 15 POWELL, supra note 7, § 84D.01[1].
15 POWELL supra note 7, § 84D.01[2]; Eric T. Freyfogle, The Installment Land Contract As Lease:
Habitability Protections and the Low-Income Purchaser, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 293, 308–10 (1987).
28 See infra text accompanying notes 38–51.
29 One may view an installment land contract as similar to a “lease-and-purchase” with a nominal
purchase price, i.e., the last month’s installment. State property law, however, may recharacterize such
arrangement as a disguised security device. See Liona Corp. v. PCH Assocs. (In re PCH Assocs.), 804 F.2d
193, 199–200 (2d Cir. 1986).
30 Compare Rabkin & Johnson, supra note 11, form 21.19 (sample installment land contract for
residential property) with id., form 21.37 (sample short-term earnest money contract for an office building).
31 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 3.26.
32 Id.
33 See, e.g., Rabkin & Johnson, supra note 11, form 21.19 (sample installment land contract for
residential property).
34 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 3.33.
27
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earnest money contract with an extremely long “closing” period—for example,
fifteen years rather than three months, an installment land contract is not an
earnest money contract.35 The significantly longer term of an installment land
contract indicates that any analogy between an installment land contract and an
earnest money contract, even in form, should be questionable.36 More
importantly, because an installment land contract gives the purchaser
immediate possession and control of the property, it functions differently from
an earnest money contract.37
On the other hand, an installment land contract is very similar to a
mortgage—especially a seller-financed purchase money mortgage—because
immediate possession and a prolonged payment period are characteristics of a
mortgage.38 Like the purchaser of an installment land contract, the mortgagor
pays monthly installments over many years to eventually become the
unencumbered owner of the property.39 During the terms of the mortgage and
the installment land contract, both the mortgagor and the purchaser have
control over the property, pay taxes, make improvements, and maintain the
premises.40 Some commentators argue the distinction between the two should
be abolished,41 and some state legislatures have statutorily eliminated the
distinction between mortgages and installment land contracts that functionally
resemble mortgages.42 However, many other states keep installment land
contract purchaser’s and mortgagor’s rights distinct.43 Unlike a mortgagor, an

35 An earnest money contract is an example where the contractual principles dominate. The contract sets
out the allocation of risks for a short time between the execution and the closing. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra
note 8, § 3.26. Of course, the equitable doctrines regarding property rights are applicable during the payment
period, and the transaction is viewed as a generic sale where—just like any other sales—the payment and the
conveyance of property are not simultaneous but reasonably close to show the parties’ intent to make a swift
sale. Therefore, the § 365 inquiry is appropriate to earnest money contracts which are similar to contracts for
sale of goods and services.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 15 POWELL, supra note 7, § 84D.01[2].
39 Id.
40 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 3.26.
41 Id. § 3.38 (discussing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. (MORTGAGES) § 3.4, cmt. d (1997)).
42 See, e.g., Lucas v. Bishop, 956 P.2d 871, 873 (Okla. 1998) (discussing an Oklahoma statute that
provides “[a]ll contracts for deed . . . made for the purpose of establishing an immediate and continuing right
of possession . . . shall to that extent be deemed and held mortgages, and shall be subject to the same rules of
foreclosure . . . as are prescribed in relation to mortgages.” (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, § 11A)).
43 See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, §§ 3.28, 3.29. Some state courts that are known to enforce the
forfeiture clause have ruled an installment land contract can be an equitable mortgage based on the terms of
the contract and the intent of the parties, but in their view, the rights of the seller and the purchaser originate
from the contractual arrangement not the inherent functions or characteristics of the installment land contract.
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installment land contract purchaser may face forfeiture instead of being
protected by the state foreclosure process.44 Although the scope of the
purchaser’s rights varies greatly depending on the jurisdiction, the purchaser’s
rights generally are less than those of a mortgagor on the same property.45
Some characteristics of an installment land contract may be comparable to
those of a lease.46 An installment land contract is like a lease because, during
the contract term, the purchaser does not have any current interest in title and
only has the right to possess the property.47 The similarity becomes more
pronounced once the forfeiture clause is enforced because the purchaser will
have no interest or restitution damages after the forfeiture.48 It would be as if
the possession and monthly payments had been a lease arrangement where the
purchaser only had possessory rights.49 However, unlike the lessee, a purchaser
has more control over the property similar to a mortgagor and can compel
conveyance of the property once the payments are complete.50 The argument
that analogizes an installment land contract to a lease emphasizes the typical
purchaser’s financial instability, the possibility of an overpriced contract
because of the seller’s attempt to reduce his risk, and as a result, the high
likelihood of forfeiture.51 However, if the purchaser does pay in full, he will be
entitled to the title to the property unlike a lessee. Therefore, a purchaser is
entitled to something more than a lessee, but the competing possibilities of
eventual ownership and conditional “equity”—that can be destroyed through
forfeiture—raise the question to what extent a purchaser is more entitled than a
lessee.
2. Enforcement of the Contractual Rights Under Installment Land
Contracts
One of the prominent concerns in analyzing an installment land contract is
the enforcement of its forfeiture clause. In theory, the seller and the purchaser

See e.g., Russell v. Richards 702 P.2d 993, 995–96 (N.M. 1985); Bishop v. Beecher, 355 P.2d 277, 278–79
(N.M. 1960) (recognizing the utility of installment land contracts in light of risk allocation and reaffirmed its
refusal to consider an installment land contract as a mortgage).
44 See discussion infra Part I.A.2.
45 15 POWELL, supra note 7, § 84D.01[2].
46 See generally Freyfogle, supra note 27.
47 Id. at 308, 312.
48 See supra text accompanying notes 10–14.
49 Freyfogle, supra note 27, at 308–09.
50 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 3.26.
51 See Freyfogle, supra note 27, at 308–09.
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of an installment land contract exercise their freedom to contract, and the
forfeiture clause permits the seller to terminate all rights of the purchaser in the
event of default.52 According to the typical terms of a forfeiture clause, the
purchaser does not have a right of redemption upon default and may lose both
the possession of the property and all past payment if the seller exercises the
forfeiture clause.53 When installment land contracts first emerged, courts in
many jurisdictions honored the intent of the contracting parties and enforced
the forfeiture clause as written.54 However, state jurisprudence had developed
to diverge from strict enforcement.
There are two dimensions to how state installment land contract
jurisprudence developed: (1) whether the state judicially or legislatively
addressed installment land contract enforcement; and (2) whether the state
considers an installment land contract to be more like a contract or a
mortgage.55 How exactly one state law compares to another in these two
dimensions is a matter of degree.
The forfeiture clause lost much of its power as some state legislatures
started to focus on the parties’ property rights rather than the strict terms of the
contracts. Some state laws have ameliorated the inherently harsh
characteristics of installment land contracts for the purchaser in various ways
and, as a result, created a gradation of different seller and purchaser rights
across the country. States such as Oklahoma have codified the rule that a
typical installment land contract arrangement creates a mortgage, and the
seller’s remedy is limited to foreclosure.56 Other states such as Illinois,
Michigan, and Ohio provide in statutes some mortgage-like purchaser
protections such as grace period, notice of forfeiture, restitution, and even

52

15 POWELL, supra note 7, § 84D.03[2].
NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, §§ 3.26, 3.27, 3.33; Rabkin & Johnson, supra note 11, form 21.19.
54 15 POWELL, supra note 7, § 84D.03[1]; NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 3.27.
55 See, e.g., Lucas v. Bishop, 956 P.2d 871, 873 (Okla. 1998) (referring to Oklahoma statute that defines
an installment land contract is like a mortgage (citing 16 OKL. ST. ANN. tit. 16, §11A)); Mackiewicz v. J.J. &
Assocs., 514 N.W.2d 613, 621 (Neb. 1994) (finding that the installment land contract is almost equivalent to a
mortgage); Russell v. Richards, 702 P.2d 993, 995–96 (N.M. 1985) (finding that the installment land contract
provisions are enforceable as written); Keene v. Schnetz, 468 N.E.2d 125, 127–28 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983)
(referring to Ohio statute that does not analogize an installment land contract to a mortgage (citing OHIO REV.
CODE §§ 5313.05, 5313.06)).
56 Lucas, 956 P.2d at 873 (“All contracts for deed . . . made for the purpose of establishing an immediate
and continuing right of possession . . . shall to that extent be deemed and held mortgages, and shall be subject
to the same rules of foreclosure . . . as are prescribed in relation to mortgages.” (citing 16 OKL. ST. ANN. tit.
16, § 11A)).
53
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possible foreclosure depending on the extent of past installment payments and
the use of the property (residential or commercial).57
In other states, courts have provided protection for purchasers in
installment land contracts. The judicial treatment of installment land contracts
varies significantly state by state. Courts in Nebraska and Kentucky, for
example, have effectively ruled that an installment land contract is a mortgage
“for all intents and purposes.”58 States such as Indiana judicially treat an
installment land contract as a mortgage with a few exceptions.59 Some states
like Florida and California judicially provide many mortgage-like protections
for the purchasers without an explicit ruling that an installment land contract is
a mortgage.60 A few states like New Mexico and South Dakota allow limited
judicial purchaser protections and enforce the pro-seller contract terms to a
great extent.61
B. An Overview of the Treatment of Installment Land Contracts Under the
Code
There are two possible treatments of installment land contracts under the
Code: (1) a court may find an installment land contract is an “executory
contract;” or (2) a court may find that it creates a security interest on property
similar to a mortgage.62 If an installment land contract is an executory contract,
57

Eppers v. First Nat’l Bank of Lake Forest, 503 N.E.2d 589, 591–92 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (citing 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/9-104.1(a)); Keene v. Schnetz, 468 N.E.2d 125, 127–28 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (citing OHIO
REV. CODE §§ 5313.05, 5313.06); Gruskin v. Fisher, 273 N.W.2d 893, 896–97 (Mich. 1979) (citing MICH.
COMP. LAWS §§ 600.5750, 600.5726); see also NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 3.28; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP. (MORTGAGES) § 3.4 (1997). The provision of mortgage-like remedies in these states does not
imply bankruptcy courts’ analyses of installment land contracts are similar. See discussion infra Part II.A.3.
58 Mackiewicz v. J.J. & Assocs., 514 N.W.2d 613, 621 (Neb. 1994); see also Sebastian v. Floyd, 585
S.W.2d 381, 383 (Ky. 1979). For further discussion, see NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 3.29.
59 See, e.g., Skendzel v. Marshall, 301 N.E.2d 641, 645–47, 650 (Ind. 1973) (noting that forfeiture is
appropriate if the purchaser abandons the property or has paid minimal amount of money). For further
discussions, see NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 3.29.
60 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. (MORTGAGES) § 3.4 (1997); see, e.g., Petersen v. Hartell, 707 P.2d
232, 239–40 (Cal. 1985); see also NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 3.29.
61 See, e.g., Russell v. Richards, 702 P.2d 993, 995–96 (N.M. 1985); Heikkila v. Carver, 378 N.W.2d
214, 218–19 (S.D. 1985).
62 See, e.g., Terrell v. Albaugh (In re Terrell), 892 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1989) (executory contract); Mitchell
v. Streets (In re Streets & Beard Farm P’ship), 882 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1989) (security interest on property);
O’Brien v. Ravenswood Apartments, Ltd. (In re Ravenswood Apartments, Ltd.), 338 B.R. 307 (6th Cir. B.A.P.
2006) (executory contract); Heartline Farms, Inc. v. Daly, 128 B.R. 246 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1990) (security
interest on property), aff’d, 934 F.2d 985 (8th Cir. 1991); In re Speck, 50 B.R. 307 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1985)
(executory contract), aff’d, 798 F.2d 279 (8th Cir. 1986); Shaw v. Dawson (In re Shaw), 48 B.R. 857 (Bankr.
D.N.M. 1985) (security interest on property).
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the trustee may “assume or reject” the executory contract in its entirety.63 If an
installment land contract creates a security interest in the property in purchaser
bankruptcy, the seller has a secured claim against the estate and should follow
the relevant Code provisions regarding secured claims.64 In determining which
Code section applies, courts have asked if an installment land contract is
“executory” for the purposes of bankruptcy law.
1. The Meaning of “Executory” in § 365
The Code does not define the term “executory contract” anywhere.65 There
are two approaches in analyzing the applicability of § 365: the Countryman
Approach and the Functional Approach. The vast majority of cases follow the
Countryman Approach, but a few cases adopted the Functional Approach,
especially when courts found that the Countryman Approach may yield
problematic results.66
The legislative history of § 365 suggests congressional approval of
Professor Countryman’s definition of executory contract.67 According to
Professor Countryman’s articles, an executory contract for bankruptcy
purposes is “a contract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the
other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to
complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the
performance of the other.”68 Professor Countryman reasoned that if the debtor
has materially performed, then only the non-debtor’s material obligations are
remaining.69 The contract is wholly beneficial to the estate, and the trustee
should not be given an option to reject it accidentally.70 If the non-debtor has
materially performed, then only the debtor’s material obligations are
remaining.71 The contract is wholly burdensome to the estate, and the trustee
should not be given an option to accidentally assume it and elevate the non-

63

11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2006).
Id. § 506.
65 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 365.02[2][a] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2011).
66 See, e.g., Thompkins v. Lil’ Joe Records, Inc., 476 F.3d 1294, 1305 n.13 (11th Cir. 2007); Sipes v. Atl.
Gulf Comtys. (In re Gen. Dev. Corp.), 84 F.3d 1364, 1375 (11th Cir. 1996).
67 H.R. REP. NO. 95-959, at 347 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6304 (“Though there is no
precise definition of what contracts are executory, it generally includes contracts on which performance
remains due to some extent on both sides.”); 3 COLLIER, supra note 65, ¶ 365.02[1].
68 Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 457–58.
71 Id. at 457.
64
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debtor’s claim to administrative status, which would give it priority over other
secured claims.72 Therefore, it is only when the contract is materially
unperformed on both sides that the trustee should be given an option to assess
the value of the contract and decide whether to assume or reject it.73
When adopting the Countryman Approach, courts often ask whether the
nonperformance of either party to the contract would result in material
breach.74 Although Professor Countryman focused on mutual, unperformed
material obligations, the underlying reasoning for this inquiry is to determine
what would benefit the bankruptcy estate.75 Professor Countryman noted that
“all contracts to a greater or lesser extent are executory,” but the reason for
specifying the scope of “executory” for bankruptcy purposes is to determine
what would benefit the estate.76 As one commentator pointed out, applying the
material breach test can be thought of as a proxy for the benefit of the estate.77
Almost all courts have adopted, or at least approved of, the Countryman
Approach and applied the material breach test to contracts to determine the
applicability of § 365.78
However, following the Countryman Approach, courts often have blindly
applied the material breach test and sometimes reached inequitable results.79
Some courts and critics have questioned the merits of the Countryman
Approach and argued for a refocus on the benefit to the estate.80 The material
breach test was devised to shield against the trustee’s possible mistakes in
making an unnecessary commitment or committing an unfavorable breach.81
Although the material breach test produces sensible results in many contract
transactions, the test has produced problematic results in certain complicated
72

Id. at 459–60.
Id. at 461.
74 See 3 COLLIER, supra note 65, ¶ 365.02[2].
75 See In re Booth, 19 B.R. 53, 55 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
76 Countryman, supra note 68, at 450 (quoting 1 S. WILLISTON CONTRACTS § 14 (3d ed. 1957)).
77 Carl N. Pickerill, Executory Contracts Re-Revisited, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 63, 104 (2009).
78 3 COLLIER, supra note 65, ¶ 365.02[2].
79 Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REV. 227, 240–
42 (1989); Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding ‘Rejection,’ 59 U. COLO.
L. REV. 845, 884–89 (1988).
80 In re Booth, 19 B.R. 53; Andrew, supra note 79, at 889–95; Jerry Porter, Vendee Bankruptcy:
Installment Land Contracts and Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, 24 BULL. BUS. L. SEC. ST. B. TEX. 33, 39
(Nov. 1986) (suggesting § 105 equity powers may allow a functional approach in understanding § 365 rather
than analyzing the form of the contract); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Commission’s Recommendations
Concerning the Treatment of Bankruptcy Contracts, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 463, 465–70 (1997). See
generally Westbrook, supra note 79.
81 Countryman, supra note 68, at 457.
73
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contracts where the rights and obligations of the parties are difficult to
characterize.82 Some examples include option contracts,83 noncompete
covenants,84 and intellectual property licensing agreements.85 Installment land
contracts are another example to which Professor Countryman’s material
breach test does not neatly apply.86
Courts have responded to the anomalies arising from the Countryman
Approach in various ways. They have often defended the approach by focusing
on a single reference in the legislative history, which suggests that Congress
had some version of the Countryman Approach in mind for § 365.87 While
adhering to the Countryman Approach, some courts have adjusted the scope of
the word “executory” to reach equitable results.88
Against the heavy precedent following the Countryman Approach, one case
proposed a different line of reasoning, often referred to as the Functional
Approach. The court in In re Booth declined to follow the Countryman
Approach and decided to focus on the benefit to the estate.89 The court
correctly noted that Professor Countryman proposed the material breach test
because the contract may be beneficial to the bankruptcy estate only when
there are material obligations left on the both sides.90 However, the court raised
the question of whether applying the Countryman Approach will always

82

Westbrook, supra note 79, at 240–42.
E.g., In re G-N Partners, 48 B.R. 462, 465 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (“It is inappropriate to apply a
generalized rule such as Countryman to all situations.” (quoting In re Adolphsen, 38 B.R. 776, 779 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1983) (option contract case))) (contract for deed in purchaser bankruptcy).
84 E.g., In re Norquist, 43 B.R. 224, 226–27 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1984) (warning against the “adherence
to the rigid Countryman definition” in the covenant not to compete case, as it may fail to support “the purpose
and spirit of the Bankruptcy Code”).
85 Westbrook, supra note 79, at 240 (noting that Congress had to step in to fix the commercially
disruptive result arising from Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond Metal
Finishers, Inc.), 765 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985) (a case involving a rejection of a technology license),
superseded by statute, Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-506, -102
Stat. 2538 (codified as 11 U.S.C §§ 101, 365(n) (2006))).
86 Some courts have argued that Professor Countryman’s description of executory contracts was meant to
address only non-installment contracts such as earnest money contracts. Heartline Farms, Inc. v. Daly, 128
B.R. 246, 251 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1990), aff’d, 934 F.2d 985 (8th Cir. 1991).
87 Terrell v. Albaugh (In re Terrell), 892 F.2d 469, 471 (6th Cir.1989) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-959, at
347 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6304); see also In re Speck, 50 B.R. 307, 308 (Bankr.
D.S.D. 1985), aff’d, 798 F.2d 279 (8th Cir. 1986); Shaw v. Dawson (In re Shaw), 48 B.R. 857, 859 (Bankr.
D.N.M. 1985); supra note 66.
88 See, e.g., In re Norquist, 43 B.R. at 229–30.
89 In re Booth, 19 B.R. 53, 64 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
90 Id. at 55.
83
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benefit the estate.91 The court reasoned that the executory contract analysis
should be performed in light of the benefit to the estate, which is the ultimate
focus in bankruptcy.92 The In re Booth court, and others that soon followed it,
noted that courts should not focus too much on the form (i.e. unperformed
material obligations on both sides of the contract) when determining whether a
contract is an “executory contract” for § 365 purposes.93
Critics of the executory contract jurisprudence have embraced the approach
of In re Booth and urged that courts should not adhere to Professor
Countryman’s rigid test but instead focus on the benefit to the estate.94 They
argue against a special bankruptcy meaning of “executory,” which courts have
understood to imply material and mutually unperformed obligations.95 This
criticism emphasizes that the material breach test does not serve any
meaningful purpose in bankruptcy.96 One critic argued that instead of focusing
on the form of a contract, courts should take a Functional Approach of
determining the applicability of § 365 based on what would benefit the
bankruptcy estate.97 Another critic argued that any unperformed contract
should be governed by § 365.98 In essence, these criticisms suggest that the
Countryman Approach misleadingly links benefit to the estate to the word
“executory” in § 365 and gives an unnecessary special meaning to the word.99
At least one circuit court and several lower federal courts have adopted and
approved the Functional Approach.100 However, only a minority of courts
follow the Functional Approach because of the apparent disregard of the
statutory language “executory” and the wealth of case law embracing the
Countryman Approach.101

91

Id.
Id. at 56–57.
93 Arrow Air v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. (In re Arrow Air, Inc.), 60 B.R. 117, 121–22 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1986); In re Adolphsen, 38 B.R. 776, 778–79 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983); In re Booth, 19 B.R. at 56–57.
94 See Westbrook, supra note 80, at 465–70. See generally Westbrook, supra note 79.
95 Andrew, supra note 79, at 889–90; Westbrook, supra note 79, at 239–40.
96 Westbrook, supra note 79, at 240–42.
97 Id. at 243–44.
98 Andrew, supra note 79, at 889–90.
99 Id. at 889–90; Westbrook, supra note 79, at 239–40.
100 See, e.g., Thompkins v. Lil’ Joe Records, Inc., 476 F.3d 1294, 1305 n.13 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that
the court has “tacitly approved” the “functional approach”); Sipes v. Atl. Gulf Cmtys. (In re Gen. Dev. Corp.)
84 F.3d 1364, 1375 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding that the land sale contract is executory to benefit the seller’s
bankruptcy estate).
101 See, e.g., Butler v. Resident Care Innovation Corp., 241 B.R. 37, 44 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1999) (“[T]he
functional analysis expressly ignores the statutory mandate that the contract be executory under § 365.”); In re
92
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2. Executory Contracts Under § 365
If a court finds that an installment land contract is “executory,” the trustee
has to decide either to perform fully or to reject and breach the contract. The
Code provides that the trustee may “assume or reject” the contract subject to
the court’s approval.102 To assume the contract, the trustee must cure the
default, if any; compensate the other party for pecuniary loss resulting from the
default; and provide adequate assurance of future performance.103 Section 365
provides a broad right to cure, and the trustee is not necessarily required to
perform exactly what is written in the contract.104 Courts have ruled that as
long as the trustee can offer a “substantial equivalent” of the full compliance of
the contract, the cure is adequate.105 In assuming the contract, the trustee also
has to show an adequate assurance of future performance, which depends on
the facts of each case.106 Certain contracts involving personal services may not
be assumable, but this exception generally does not apply to installment land
contracts.107
If a court finds that an installment land contract is an executory contract,
the trustee is often forced to make a decision to assume or reject the contract in
a relatively short time. In a liquidation case, if the trustee does not assume or
reject an executory contract within sixty days, the contract is deemed

Child World, Inc., 147 B.R. 847, 851 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“Manifestly, [the functional] approach ignores
the statutory requirement that the contract to be assumed or rejected must be ‘executory.’”).
102 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2006). The relevant parts of § 365(a) provide that “the trustee, subject to the
court’s approval, may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.” Id. This
provision makes exceptions for commodity contracts addressed in §§ 765–66, but installment land contracts do
not fall into that category. Id.
103 Id. § 365(b)(1)(A)–(C).
104 3 COLLIER, supra note 65, ¶ 365.06[3][b].
105 Id.
106 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(C); see also 3 COLLIER, supra note 65, ¶ 365.06[3][a]. In determining whether
an assurance is adequate, “courts have considered some of the following factors: the debtor’s payment history,
presence of a guarantee, presence of a security deposit, evidence of profitability . . . [and] the general outlook
in the debtor’s industry.” Id.
107 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c). Section 365(c)(1) provides that the trustee cannot assume the contract if a
nonbankrupt party to the contract does not consent or is excused based on nonbankruptcy law. Id. § 365(c)(1).
This provision is applicable, for example, to a non-assignable personal service contract, which depends on
particular personal skills, where the nonbankrupt party does not accept the assignee’s replacement of the
debtor’s performance. 3 COLLIER, supra note 65, ¶ 365.07[1]. Because installment land contracts generally do
not depend on personal skills or performances, they are not likely to fall into this category of exceptions.
Section 365(c)(2) also has a limited exception for contracts for certain debt financing. 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(2).
However, the scope of the provision is narrow because it does not reach all types of contracts that extend credit
to the debtor. 3 COLLIER, supra note 65, ¶ 365.07[2].
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rejected.108 In other cases, courts usually have concluded that once a contract is
determined to be executory, the trustee must either assume or reject the
executory contract quickly.109
Once the trustee determines whether he is able to assume the executory
contract, he needs to decide whether it is beneficial to the bankruptcy estate to
assume—or assume and assign—the contract.110 This step is crucial because
the decision to assume the executory contract requires the estate to perform the
contract in full.111 Furthermore, the trustee can only assume the contract in its
entirety, and once the trustee assumes the contract, all the costs associated with
curing or performing the contract obtain the status of administrative
expenses,112 which have priority over unsecured claims.113 After the trustee
decides to assume the contract, a court generally reviews the decision to
assume based on the business judgment standard.114 Once the trustee assumes
the executory contract, he may assign the contract to a third party if he finds
the assignment would be beneficial to the bankruptcy estate.115
The significance of the assumption of a contract cannot be overstated. In
effect, the assumption of the contract overrides the policy against contracting
108 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(1). The relevant portion of § 365(d)(1) provides that “[i]n a case under chapter 7 of
this title, if the trustee does not assume or reject an executory contract or unexpired lease . . . of the debtor
within 60 days after the order for relief, or within such additional time as the court, for cause within such 60day period, fixes, then such contract or lease is deemed rejected.” Id.; see also 3 COLLIER, supra note 65, ¶¶
365.03[6] n.52, 365.05[1].
109 Generally, in chapters 9, 11, 12, and 13 cases executory contracts are assumed or rejected before the
confirmation of a plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2) (2006); see also 3 COLLIER, supra note 65, ¶ 365.03[6]. A
few courts and academics have reasoned that the trustee may choose to neither assume nor reject an executory
contract, and when the contract is not assumable or the trustee decides not to assume or reject, the contract can
“ride through” bankruptcy in a chapter 11 case. Id. The contract is not terminated or deemed rejected in this
case and would continue to exist throughout bankruptcy and thereafter. Id. For more discussion on “ride
through” and implications of an assumption or rejection, see Andrew, supra note 79, at 878–81.
110 See 3 COLLIER, supra note 65, ¶ 365.02[2]. If the executory contract is not in default, the trustee would
not determine if he can assume the contract based on § 365(b). Id. ¶ 365.09. Instead, the trustee would skip the
§ 365(b) step, and determine whether to assume or assign the contract. Id.
111 Id. ¶ 365.03[2].
112 See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b).
113 Id. § 507(a)(2). In bankruptcy law, the cost of curing and performing the executory contract has been
considered administrative. 3 COLLIER, supra note 65, ¶ 365.LH[1]. The implication of the elevated status of
the seller of an assumed installment land contract in purchaser bankruptcy will be discussed in Part II.B.3.
114 3 COLLIER, supra note 65, ¶¶ 365.03[1], 365.03[2].
115 11 U.S.C. § 365(f). The trustee has to provide adequate assurance that the third-party assignee will
perform the contract in order to assign the contract. 3 COLLIER, supra note 65, ¶ 365.09[1]. Adequate
assurance of performance is only assurance of material performance and need not be exact compliance. Id.
Once the contract is so assigned, § 365(k) relieves the trustee and the bankruptcy estate from any future
liability after the assignment. 11 U.S.C. § 365(k); see also 3 COLLIER, supra note 65, ¶ 365.09[1].
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around bankruptcy law behind the § 365 provisions.116 Section 365 sets out
certain contract clauses that are not enforceable in bankruptcy.117 Any contract
clause that attempts to terminate or modify the rights and obligations of the
parties upon insolvency, bankruptcy, or appointment of a trustee is not
enforceable.118 Similarly, contract clauses that attempt to terminate or modify
the contract upon assumption or assignment of the contract are invalid.119
Therefore, an attempt to contract around bankruptcy law through clauses that
are triggered directly or incidentally by the party’s bankruptcy is
unenforceable.120 One policy reason behind these provisions may be to void
the contracting parties’ attempt to be materially unaffected by one of the
parties’ entry into bankruptcy.121 However, the assumption of a contract may
undermine this policy since the assumed contract enjoys administrative status
and will be performed in full, and the non-debtor parties are materially
unaffected by the debtor’s bankruptcy.122
If the trustee determines that the executory contract is not beneficial to the
estate, the trustee may reject the contract. Generally, the rejection of a contract
constitutes a breach, and the estate should pay damages, if any.123 In case of
rejection, the Code treats a claim for the breach as a prepetition claim, which is
not entitled to priority under § 507.124 The breach neither terminates the
contract nor eliminates all the rights and obligations regarding third parties,125
and the remedies following the § 365 rejection almost always exclude specific
performance.126 Since the rejection costs the estate only pecuniary damages
116 See discussion infra Part II.B.2 (describing how the Code produces a preference for the assumption of
an installment land contract, and the nonbankrupt seller is overly protected from the purchaser’s bankruptcy).
117 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(2), (e), (f)(3).
118 Id. § 365(b)(2), (e).
119 Id. § 365(f)(3) (2006); see also 3 COLLIER, supra note 65, ¶ 365.09[3].
120 11 U.S.C. § 365(e); see also 3 COLLIER, supra note 65, ¶ 365.08[1].
121 See 3 COLLIER, supra note 65, ¶ 365.08[1].
122 See discussion infra Part II.B.2 (describing how the Code produces a preference for the assumption of
an installment land contract, and the nonbankrupt seller is overly protected from the purchaser’s bankruptcy).
123 11 U.S.C. § 365(g). The relevant part of § 365(g) provides that “[e]xcept as provided in
subsection[] . . . (i)(2) of this section, the rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor
constitutes a breach of such contract or lease . . . immediately before the date of the filing of the petition.” Id.
124 Id.; see also 3 COLLIER, supra note 65, ¶ 365.10[1]. Section 365(g) provides in detail which date is
considered the date of breach in various situations involving post-assumption rejection and conversion to
different chapter bankruptcies. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g).
125 3 COLLIER, supra note 65, ¶ 365.10[3].
126 Id. ¶ 365.10[1]. Often the lack of a specific performance remedy may give the debtor incentive to
characterize a contract as executory and reject the contract. See id. ¶ 365.10[1]. Some commentators argue that
this power is akin to avoidance. Westbrook, supra note 79, at 309–10; see Andrew, supra note 79, at 901–31;
Westbrook, supra note 80, at 470–72.
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with no priority, it can be a powerful tool for the estate to get out of
unfavorable contracts. However, because an installment land contract
purchaser’s obligation is usually only pecuniary, this limitation to the seller’s
relief is not useful for the purchaser in bankruptcy.127
Although the Code is silent on the case of purchaser bankruptcy, Congress
has expressly addressed the case of seller bankruptcy. The power of the
bankrupt seller to reject an installment land contract resulted in inequity to the
detriment of the non-debtor-purchaser under the Bankruptcy Act of 1938.128 In
light of this inequitable treatment of the non-debtor-purchaser, Congress
adopted § 365(i) and (j) in the Code to address the rights of the non-debtorpurchaser in possession of the property.129 If the purchaser is in possession

127

See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
The relevant parts of the Bankruptcy Act provided that “the trustee shall assume or reject any
executory contract, including unexpired leases of real property.” Bankruptcy Act of 1938, Pub. L. 75-696, 52
Stat. 840, 880–81. The Bankruptcy Act also provided that “the rejection of an executory contract or unexpired
lease . . . shall constitute a breach of such contract or lease as of the date of the filing of the petition.” Id. at
873–74. Under the Bankruptcy Act, the bankrupt seller of a land sale contract could reject the contract and
deprive the buyer of its possession of property without full compensation resulting in a “windfall to an
undeserving party”—the bankrupt seller. 3 COLLIER, supra note 65, ¶ 365.12.
129 REPORT OF THE COMM’N ON BANKR. LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at
199, 206; id. pt. 2, at 157–58, 172–73 (1973). The relevant parts of § 365(i) and (j) provide:
128

(i)(1) If the trustee rejects an executory contract of the debtor for the sale of real
property . . . under which the purchaser is in possession, such purchaser may treat such contract
as terminated, or, in the alternative, may remain in possession of such real property . . .
(2) If such purchaser remains in possession—
(A) such purchaser shall continue to make all payments due under such contract, but may,
offset against such payments any damages occurring after the date of the rejection of such
contract caused by the nonperformance of any obligation of the debtor after such date, but
such purchaser does not have any rights against the estate on account of any damages arising
after such date from such rejection, other than such offset; and
(B) the trustee shall deliver title to such purchaser in accordance with the provisions of such
contract, but is relieved of all other obligations to perform under such contract.
(j) A purchaser that treats an executory contract as terminated under subsection (i) of this section,
or a party whose executory contract to purchase real property from the debtor is rejected and
under which such party is not in possession, has a lien on the interest of the debtor in such
property for the recovery of any portion of the purchase price that such purchaser or party has
paid.
11 U.S.C. § 365(i), (j). Congress included these provisions in the Code in response to In re New York Investors
Mutual Group where the court allowed the seller to reject the eighteen-month long contract for sale of land. In
re N.Y. Investors Mut. Grp. 143 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). Courts have understood that through § 365(i)
and (j), Congress intended to protect the purchaser of a “long-term land sale contract not passing title until the
full purchase price has been paid.” Summit Land Co. v. Allen (In re Summit Land Co.), 13 B.R. 310, 317
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when the seller files for bankruptcy, the purchaser can either treat the contract
as terminated or remain in possession even after the purchaser rejects the
contract.130 If the purchaser chooses to remain in possession after rejection, the
purchaser must complete the future payments, and the seller has to deliver the
title to the purchaser on completion of payments.131 The purchaser may offset
any damages due to the seller’s rejection of the contract from the purchaser’s
future payments, but the purchaser cannot file an affirmative claim to get the
damages after the rejection.132 Also, once the seller delivers the title to the
purchaser, the seller is relieved of all liabilities.133 On the other hand, if the
purchaser chooses to treat the rejected contract as terminated, or the purchaser
is not in possession of the property, the purchaser has a lien on the property for
the payment it has already paid.134 This lien, however, is of the lowest priority
relative to the pre-existing encumbrances on the property.135 These provisions
address only seller bankruptcy and the Code is silent on the treatment of the
purchaser-in-possession in purchaser bankruptcy.136
In summary, an installment land contract, when found to be executory by a
court, can be (1) assumed and performed in full ahead of paying the general
unsecured creditors; (2) rejected by the trustee with damages paid as an
unsecured claim; (3) performed according to the exception provided in § 365(i)
for the purchaser-in-possession; or (4) rejected creating a low-priority lien for
the purchaser according to § 365(j). In purchaser bankruptcy, the relevant
scenarios are (1) and (2).137

(Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (quoting REPORT OF THE COMM’N ON BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 2 at 158 (1973)).
130 11 U.S.C. § 365(i)(1).
131 Id. § 365(i)(2).
132 Id. § 365(i)(2)(A). Therefore, the recovery for the purchaser who remains in possession is capped at
the amount of payments yet to be paid. See 3 COLLIER, supra note 65, ¶ 365.12[1]. However, if the purchaser
is not in possession upon the seller’s rejection or the purchaser treats the contract as terminated, there is no
limitation for damages. Id. ¶ 365.12[2].
133 Id. § 365(i)(2)(B).
134 Id. § 365(j).
135 3 COLLIER, supra note 65, ¶ 365.12[4].
136 See discussion infra Part II.B.4.
137 The “ride through” may be another option as some courts and commentators have suggested. 3
COLLIER, supra note 65, ¶ 365.03[6]. However, the “ride through” is essentially bypassing bankruptcy as if it
did not happen and therefore has little relevance to this Comment on how the federal bankruptcy law affects
and interacts with the state property laws.
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3. Secured Claims Under the Code
If a court finds that an installment land contract is not “executory,” the
arrangement will be viewed as creating a secured claim on property similar to a
mortgage.138 The seller will have a secured claim on property under § 506,139
and federal courts should determine the substantive rights of the parties to the
secured lien according to the applicable state laws.140 The purchaser’s biggest
advantage is time because the purchaser will be protected by the automatic stay
and the payments may be rescheduled.141 The purchaser will have a chance to
cure over time and maintain the premises, and the trustee does not have to
make a quick decision either to fully perform or to breach. If the purchaser
does not or cannot pay the installments, the court will determine the priority
based on the state notice and recording laws and follow the state foreclosure
procedure.142 As a result, the purchaser will get the mortgagor protections set
by the state foreclosure laws.
Moreover, the purchaser can take advantage of the state mortgage law as
well as federal bankruptcy law without making a drastic decision to “assume or
reject” the installment land contract. If the value of the property is greater than
the contract price, the purchaser may claim equity in the property even if the
purchaser loses the property—i.e., no full performance. Also, depending on the
fair market value of the property, federal bankruptcy law may limit state-given
rights of the non-debtor party.143 If the property is not worth as much as the
full contract price, the purchaser may reduce the seller’s secured claim to the
value of the property, thus leaving the rest of the price as an unsecured
claim.144 An exception to this scenario is a chapter 11 case, in which the seller

138 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Streets (In re Streets & Beard Farm P’ship), 882 F.2d 233, 235 (7th Cir. 1989);
Heartline Farms, Inc. v. Daly, 128 B.R. 246, 248–49 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1990), aff’d, 934 F.2d 985 (8th Cir.
1991). In general, a court may find that a contract partially performed is not executory. See supra Part I.B.1
(discussing what is “executory”). The trustee may enforce or abandon the debtor’s rights under the nonexecutory contract, and the non-debtor party can file a proof of claim under § 501. See 11 U.S.C. § 501; 3
COLLIER, supra note 65, ¶ 365.LH[1]. Courts have generally found that if an installment land contract is not an
executory contract, the installment land contract is not just a partially performed contract but a mortgage. See
In re Streets & Beard Farm, 882 F.2d at 235.
139 11 U.S.C. § 506 (2006); see also 4 COLLIER, supra note 65, ¶ 506.01.
140 See Butner v. U.S., 440 U.S. 48, 54–55 (1979).
141 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
142 See Butner, 440 U.S. at 54–55.
143 See Westbrook, supra note 79, at 252–53.
144 See, e.g., Fox v. Hill (In re Fox), 83 B.R. 290, 294 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988). The purchaser may reduce
the amount of the lien depending on the facts of the case. Because home mortgages are exempt from
modification, the major advantage of the mortgage characterization of an installment land contract for a home

LEE GALLEYS3

2013]

6/27/2013 1:58 PM

INSTALLMENT LAND CONTRACTS

445

may elect to keep the full contract price as a secured claim.145 However, even
then, the purchaser may be relieved from paying the installments on time as
provided in the contract.146 Therefore, the purchaser may enjoy the reduction
of payments, delay of payments, or both, if the installment land contract is
treated as creating a secured claim.
C. Judicial Decisions on the Applicability of § 365 to Installment Land
Contracts
Federal courts generally have taken three approaches when asked whether
an installment land contract is “executory” in purchaser bankruptcy. Some
courts have strictly applied the material breach test of the Countryman
Approach to determine whether an installment land contract is executory.147
Others have reached pro-purchaser results by relying on state laws that treat an
installment land contract as a mortgage.148 Finally, focusing on the benefit to
the estate rather than the form of the contract, a few courts have adopted the
Functional Approach.149 The internal logic of each individual case is
reasonable; however, the overall installment land contract jurisprudence in
purchaser bankruptcy has been inconsistent due to diverse state laws.150
Some federal courts have ruled that an installment land contract is not an
executory contract for bankruptcy purposes.151 Two lines of reasoning have
supported that conclusion: (1) installment land contracts are security devices,
so § 365 is inapplicable;152 or (2) the seller’s conveyance of title pursuant to an

would be to cure and maintain. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5); see also Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324
(1993).
145 Even when the fair market value assessed by the court is below the contract price, the seller may elect
to keep the full contract price as a secured claim depending on the purchaser’s payment stream in a chapter 11
case. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(2). However, the seller may not make the election because the election is not
necessarily advantageous to the seller as the seller has to forego potential unsecured claim payments. 7
COLLIER, supra note 65, ¶ 1111.03[4].
146 See supra text accompanying notes 141–42.
147 See, e.g., Terrell v. Albaugh (In re Terrell), 892 F.2d 469, 471–73 (6th Cir. 1989); O’Brien v.
Ravenswood Apartments, Ltd. (In re Ravenswood Apartments, Ltd.), 338 B.R. 307, 313 (6th Cir. B.A.P.
2006); In re Speck, 50 B.R. 307, 308 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1985), aff’d, 798 F.2d 279 (8th Cir. 1986); Shaw v.
Dawson (In re Shaw), 48 B.R. 857, 861–62 (D.N.M. 1985).
148 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Streets (In re Streets & Beard Farm P’ship), 882 F.2d 233, 234 (7th Cir. 1989);
Heartline Farms, Inc. v. Daly, 128 B.R. 246, 249, 253 (D. Neb. 1990), aff’d, 934 F.2d 985 (8th Cir. 1991).
149 See, e.g., In re Adolphsen, 38 B.R. 776, 779 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983); In re Booth, 19 B.R. 53, 55–57
(Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
150 See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
151 See, e.g., In re Streets & Beard Farm, 882 F.2d at 234; Heartline Farms, 128 B.R. at 253.
152 Heartline Farms, 128 B.R. at 253.
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installment land contract is immaterial under the Countryman Approach.153 In
states that treat an installment land contract as a security device, courts applied
reasoning (1) and avoided making the executory contract inquiry.154 In the
states that recognize equitable conversion or otherwise attribute security
device-like characteristics to installment land contracts, the courts applied
reasoning (2) and avoided the executory characterization.155
Other federal courts have treated installment land contracts as executory
contracts under the Code.156 They have argued that in the absence of a state
statute declaring an installment land contract to be a mortgage, the functional
similarities between an installment land contract and a purchase money
mortgage do not render an installment land contract a mortgage for bankruptcy
purposes.157 These courts have strictly followed the Countryman Approach and
reasoned that the purchaser had an unperformed material obligation to pay the
installments and the seller had an unperformed material obligation to transfer
the title upon full payment of the contract.158 Since the breach of either
obligation would excuse the non-breaching party from performing, the courts
have found that installment land contracts are executory for bankruptcy
purposes.159
A few courts have followed the Functional Approach in analyzing
installment land contracts in purchaser bankruptcy.160 In In re Booth, the court
ruled that an installment land contract is a mortgage in purchaser bankruptcy
even in the absence of state law clearly indicating that an installment land
contract is a mortgage.161 The court questioned the applicability of § 365 to
153

In re Streets & Beard Farm, 882 F.2d at 235.
Heartline Farms, 128 B.R. at 249, 251. The court in Heartline Farms also noted that Professor
Countryman’s rationale is not based on installment land contracts. Id. at 249–50.
155 In re Streets & Beard Farm, 882 F.2d at 235.
156 See, e.g., Terrell v. Albaugh (In re Terrell), 892 F.2d 469, 471–73 (6th Cir. 1989); O’Brien v.
Ravenswood Apartments, Ltd. (In re Ravenswood Apartments, Ltd.), 338 B.R. 307, 313 (6th Cir. B.A.P.
2006); In re Speck, 50 B.R. 307, 308 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1985), aff’d, 798 F.2d 279 (8th Cir. 1986); Shaw v.
Dawson (In re Shaw), 48 B.R. 857, 861–62 (D.N.M. 1985).
157 In re Ravenswood Apartments, 338 B.R. at 311–12.
158 In re Terrell, 892 F.2d at 472; In re Ravenswood Apartments, 338 B.R. at 315; In re Speck, 50 B.R. at
308–09; In re Shaw, 48 B.R. at 861.
159 Supra note 158.
160 See, e.g., In re Adolphsen, 38 B.R. 776, 778–79 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983); In re Booth, 19 B.R. 53, 54,
56–57 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
161 In re Booth, 19 B.R. at 62. Following the Functional Approach, courts may find that characterizing an
installment land contract as an executory contract is beneficial to the estate in seller bankruptcy. Sipes v. Gen.
Dev. Corp., 17 B.R. 1000, 1012 (S.D. Fla. 1995), aff’d sub nom. Sipes v. Atl. Gulf Comtys. Corp., 84 F.3d
1364 (11th Cir. 1996).
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installment land contracts and focused on the benefit to the estate.162 It found
that for the purchaser-debtor in the case, it is beneficial to the estate to
characterize the installment land contract as a lien, so as to increase the value
of the estate and further the rehabilitation of the bankrupt purchaser.163
Another small set of courts have held that installment land contracts cannot
be categorically characterized as either executory or non-executory for § 365
purposes.164 These courts noted that installment land contracts are not always
executory or non-executory because the characterization of installment land
contracts depends on the facts of the case, the terms of the contract, and the
rights and obligations of the parties under state law.165 The courts narrowly
held that only in specific instances the installment land contract is not
executory because it is essentially a financing device.166
Overall, federal courts have reached three general conclusions regarding
installment land contracts based on diverse reasoning. As one commentator
noted, the current status of installment land contract jurisprudence in purchaser
bankruptcy amounts to fifty different laws providing fifty different sets of
rights to the parties since there is no uniform federal treatment.167
II. THE MORTGAGE PRESUMPTION OF INSTALLMENT LAND CONTRACTS IN
PURCHASER BANKRUPTCY
A. Questioning the Applicability of § 365 to Installment Land Contracts in
Purchaser Bankruptcy
Section 365 is incompatible with installment land contracts in purchaser
bankruptcy because installment land contracts embody aspects of both a
contract and a security device, which the Code treats distinctly. As explored
below, applying § 365 to installment land contracts (1) disrupts the purchaser’s
property rights relative to other device holders within a state; (2) places
unwarranted emphasis on the contract aspect of installment land contracts; and
162

In re Booth, 19 B.R. at 55, 58–59.
Id. at 58–60.
164 See, e.g., Kane v. Inhabitants of the Town of Harpswell (In re Kane), 248 B.R. 216, 223 (1st Cir.
B.A.P. 2000), aff’d, 254 F.3d 325 (1st Cir. 2001); Leefers v. Anderson (In re Leefers), 101 B.R. 24, 26–27
(C.D. Ill. 1989).
165 In re Kane, 248 B.R. at 223–24; In re Leefers, 101 B.R. at 26–27.
166 In re Kane, 248 B.R. at 223–24. The In re Leefers court vacated the bankruptcy court’s finding of
executory contract and remanded. In re Leefers, 101 B.R. at 28.
167 Westbrook, supra note 79, at 321.
163
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(3) results in substantively inconsistent application of bankruptcy law across
states.
1. Distortion of the Purchaser’s Property Rights
Comparing how an unexpired lease and an installment land contract are
treated under § 365 illustrates the distorting effect of applying the executory
contract analysis to an installment land contract. Section 365 expressly applies
to an unexpired lease agreement.168 However, courts do not blindly apply
§ 365 to unexpired leases. When courts analyze an unexpired lease, courts
determine if the lease is a “true lease” and not a sale or disguised security
device, even though § 365 does not explicitly limit its applicability to true
leases.169 Although state law determines the parties’ substantive rights, some
federal courts have even held that the state true lease analysis may not be
wholly binding for bankruptcy purposes in light of the congressional intent
underlying § 365.170 Therefore, courts look into the “economic realities” of the
unexpired lease and ask whether the unexpired lease is or functions like a
security device before applying § 365 to an unexpired lease.171
Consider two possible arrangements for identical property between a
titleholder and a possessor. One is termed a lease and the other an installment
land contract. They both involve identical monthly payments for an identical
period of time. The possessor in each arrangement takes possession of the
property immediately. In other words, the structures of the two arrangements
are the same, and they only differ by name.
Under this scenario, if the possessor who has a “lease” files for bankruptcy,
the possessor may argue that the arrangement was a disguised security device
and § 365 is inapplicable.172 The titleholder/lessor has a secured claim on the

168

11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2006).
Courts have imported the bona fide lease requirement of § 502(b)(6) into § 365. See, e.g., Liona Corp.
v. PCH Assocs. (In re PCH Assocs.), 804 F.2d 193, 199–200 (2d Cir. 1986); In re Booth, 19 B.R. 53, 59
(Bankr. D. Utah 1982); 3 COLLIER, supra note 65, ¶ 365.02[3]; MICHAEL T. MADISON, ET AL., 2 LAW OF REAL
ESTATE FINANCING, Effect of Bankruptcy of the Mortgagor-Avoiding Powers-Recharacterization § 13:20
(2011), available at Westlaw, 2 L. Real Est. Financing § 13:20 (discussing sale-leaseback recharacterization in
bankruptcy and its implications).
170 See, e.g., Moreggia & Sons, Inc. v. Walsh (In re Moreggia & Sons, Inc.), 852 F.2d 1179, 1182–84 (9th
Cir. 1988). But see 3 COLLIER, supra note 65, ¶ 365.02[3] (state law governs the true lease analysis and the
burden of proof is on the party who wants to prove that the lease is not a true lease).
171 In re Moreggia & Sons, 852 F.2d at 1182.
172 See supra text accompanying notes 168–71.
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property, and the possessor/lessee may cure the arrearage over time and keep
the property.173
However, the bankrupt possessor who has an “installment land contract”
may not make a similar argument when a court performs the § 365 inquiry
following the Countryman Approach.174 Furthermore, if the court finds mutual,
unperformed material obligations, the possessor/purchaser must either burden
the estate by assuming the entire contract or lose the property—including any
possible equity—by rejecting the contract.175 The assumption would disturb
the possessor/purchaser’s creditors’ rights to the estate, and the rejection would
disturb the possessor/purchaser’s state-given property rights.176 The
possessor/purchaser must either pay in full on time or lose the property.177
Unlike the similarly situated lessee, the purchaser is deprived of the chance to
cure and maintain over time, and his property rights become inferior to the
lessee’s. In other words, the party who paid purported rents for the property
pursuant to a lease may be allowed to keep the property; however, the party
who paid purported price installments of the property in expectation of
obtaining title may not be allowed to keep the property.
2. Misplaced Emphasis on the Contract Aspect of Installment Land
Contracts
Bankruptcy law treats contracts and security arrangements differently.178 A
contract memorializes the parties’ agreed-upon allocation of risks of nonperformance or external circumstances.179 The mutual material obligation test
of the Countryman Approach may be necessary to at least filter out contracts
with completely unilateral rights or obligations that the trustee should not

173

See discussion supra Part I.B.3.
If the state law clearly treats installment land contracts as mortgages or if the court applies the
Functional Approach, the scenario illustrated in this hypothetical may not happen or may be ameliorated. See
discussion supra Part I.C. However, given courts’ widespread adherence to the Countryman Approach and
many state laws distinguishing installment land contracts from mortgages, this scenario would likely occur in
some jurisdictions as long as § 365 inquiry is available for installment land contracts in purchaser bankruptcy.
175 See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
176 See supra text accompanying notes 55–61; discussion supra Part I.B.2.
177 See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
178 See generally, Julis, supra note 3. Some commentators have criticized the distinct treatments of a
lease, which is a contract, and a security device in bankruptcy law. See, e.g., John D. Ayer, On the Vacuity of
the Sale/Lease Distinction, 68 IOWA L. REV. 667, 668 (1983).
179 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 154, 225 (1981).
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assume or reject at the time of the debtor’s bankruptcy.180 Indeed, the
mutuality threshold can serve as a proxy for the benefit to the estate.181
For a security device, however, bankruptcy law focuses on secured status,
maturity, filing of claims, and priority.182 A valid and legal contract may be
fully assumed or rejected, but a valid and legal security device may not be fully
rejected or assumed because the focus is not on the arrangements between the
parties but on the value of the security and the amount of debt.183
When analyzing installment land contracts, almost all courts start with
some version of executory contract inquiry. Some courts follow the
straightforward Countryman Approach.184 The courts that eventually find an
installment land contract to be non-executory reach that conclusion either by
picking and choosing multiple factors to find the lack of mutual material
obligations or by following state law to rule the contract is a security device if
the state law clearly treats an installment land contract as a mortgage.185
However, that initial inquiry highlights only the contract aspect of an
installment land contract and compromises the parties’ property rights in the
process. When courts are analyzing a mortgage agreement, they do not ask if
the mortgage agreement is executory.186 Indeed, courts have squarely rejected
very few attempts by parties who argued that a mortgage agreement is an
executory contract for bankruptcy purposes, and § 365 is wholly inapplicable
to a mortgage agreement.187
Rights embodied in a mortgage, true lease, earnest money contract, and
installment land contract in various states lie along a spectrum of mixed
property and contractual rights.188 On the one end of the spectrum, the parties’
contractual rights primarily control the parties’ relationship—a true lease and
earnest money contract are near this end of the spectrum. On the other end of
the spectrum, the parties’ property rights primarily control the parties’
relationship—a mortgage is near this end of the spectrum. An installment land
180

See supra text accompanying notes 67–78.
Pickerill, supra note 77, at 104.
182 11 U.S.C. §§ 506, 507 (2006).
183 See discussion supra Parts I.B.2–3.
184 See discussion supra Part I.C.
185 See discussion supra Part I.C.
186 Even if one asks this question, the Countryman Approach easily yields that a mortgage is not
executory for bankruptcy purposes even in title jurisdictions because the purchase money mortgagee holds title
only as a security, and it would fail the material breach test.
187 See, e.g., In re N. Am. Dealer Grp., Inc., 16 B.R. 996, 1000 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982).
188 See discussion supra Part I.A.1.
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contract is somewhere in the middle of this spectrum where both contractual
and property rights of the parties influence the parties’ relationship depending
on jurisdiction. This middle ground, however, is nonexistent in bankruptcy
law, which treats contracts and secured claims distinctly. Therefore, the
installment land contract analysis in purchaser bankruptcy must pick one end
of the spectrum, but the default position need not be on the earnest money
contract and true lease end of the spectrum where the parties’ contractual rights
may be more controlling than the parties’ property rights.
By starting with the executory contract inquiry, courts already have
assumed that an installment land contract is closer to a true lease or an earnest
money contract than a mortgage. The first question to ask is not whether there
are unperformed mutual and material obligations, whether the assumption or
rejection would benefit the estate, or whether the contract is “executory”
according to any other test. Rather, the first question should be whether the
installment land contract functions like a security device to which § 365 is
inapplicable. Even if there seems to be material obligations left on both sides
of the installment land contract, once it is determined to be a security device,
§ 365 should not apply. The purchaser’s rights may fall short of a mortgagor’s,
depending on jurisdiction. Nonetheless, such diminished purchaser rights do
not imply that the purchaser’s rights have been reduced to something equal to
or less than those of a lessee. Perhaps due to the name, an installment land
contract has been effectively presumed to be primarily a contract for § 365
purposes, and the burden has been on the party who wanted to characterize it
otherwise.
3. Substantive Inconsistency of the Installment Land Contract Analysis in
Purchaser Bankruptcy
Federal bankruptcy law does not and should not alter substantive rights in
state-governed subject areas such as property law.189 Bankruptcy law should
not disregard state property rights and create federal substantive rights for
parties to an installment land contract.190 However, the application of
bankruptcy law to states’ property law should be consistent, as bankruptcy law
provides a consistent mechanism to distribute assets among creditors with

189
190

Butner v. U.S., 440 U.S. 48, 54–55 (1979).
Westbrook, supra note 79, at 317–19.
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various interests and sets out boundaries of debt collection.191 If two states
have substantively similar property laws regarding installment land contracts,
federal courts should reason and rule similarly in bankruptcy cases arising in
each of the states.
Inconsistency often occurs in cases involving installment land contracts
because the reasoning for finding or not finding an installment land contract
executory can be so malleable.192 Assessing the state law involves several
overlapping factors such as the existence of a state statute on point, state
courts’ enforcement of forfeiture, existence of notice and grace period
requirements, existence of foreclosure requirement, and recognition of
equitable title.193 Since states have some mixture of these factors, a bankruptcy
court can focus on certain aspects of the state statute or common law to arrive
at the conclusion it desires.
For example, a state may have a statute that allows forfeiture after notice
and a grace period for a purchaser who paid a certain percentage of the full
price.194 Once the purchaser pays more than a certain percentage, the seller’s
only remedy is foreclosure. One rationale may be that the state recognizes and
enforces forfeiture, albeit with restrictions. The state law, therefore, does not
equate an installment land contract to a mortgage, and the court should apply
the executory contract analysis of § 365. However, one may argue that by
providing limitations to forfeiture, the state recognizes equitable title.
Therefore, following that argument, the court may find that an installment land
contract should be a mortgage under bankruptcy law.
The cases involving Ohio and Illinois statutes on installment land contracts
demonstrate the duality of understanding state statute and common law and the
resulting inconsistent bankruptcy law. The Ohio and Illinois statutes provide
substantively similar remedies for purchasers: both states allow forfeiture only
191 See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 777 (1987). But see Douglas G.
Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815 (1987)
(arguing for a federal distribution system that disturbs state or nonbankruptcy law as little as possible and
against special bankruptcy rules). The discussion of the fundamental purpose of federal bankruptcy law with
respect to state law is beyond the scope of this Comment. Regardless of what the fundamental purpose of
federal bankruptcy law is, the consistency sought in federal bankruptcy law is not consistent result across the
nation, but the consistent application of federal bankruptcy law to state substantive laws. See Butner, 440 U.S.
at 54–55.
192 At least one commentator argues that executory contract analysis in general is too malleable.
Westbrook, supra note 79, at 287.
193 See supra text accompanying notes 55–61.
194 See infra text accompanying notes 195–201.
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where the purchaser has not paid a certain percentage of the purchase price.195
However, the common laws of Illinois and Ohio have developed differently.196
The Seventh Circuit in In re Streets & Beard Farm found that under Illinois
law the purchaser became an equitable owner and delivery of title was a mere
formality.197 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit found that the installment land
contract was not an executory contract but a security device.198 On the other
hand, in In re Ravenswood Apartments, the Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel applied Ohio law and emphasized the seller’s retention of legal title and
noted that the restriction on the seller’s remedies should not characterize the
contract as a mortgage.199 The court rejected the idea that the resemblance
between an installment land contract and a mortgage should determine the
executory nature of the installment land contract.200 The Sixth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel found that the conveyance of title was a material
obligation under the Countryman Approach and concluded that the installment
land contract was executory.201
From these examples, one can see that the state laws that seem to provide a
similar scope of rights often are interpreted differently and result in the lack of

195

The Restatement (Third) of Property summarizes the Illinois statute as follows:
A vendor must foreclose a contract for deed entered into after November 23, 1987, as a mortgage
if the property is residential, the contract period is greater than five years and the amount due
under the contract is less than 80 percent of the contract price. As to other contracts, forfeiture is
available after notice through a “Forcible Entry and Detainer” proceeding.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. (MORTGAGES) § 3.4 (1997) (summarizing 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1106,
5/9-102). The Restatement also summarizes the Ohio statute as follows:
Contracts for deed on “property improved by a dwelling” are categorized in two ways: those that
have been in effect less than five years and on which less than 20 percent of the principal amount
has been paid; and those which have been in effect five years or more or on which 20 percent or
more has been paid. In the former situation, forfeiture is authorized, but subject to a 30-day grace
period during which purchaser may avoid forfeiture by payment of arrearages. In the latter
setting, the contract must be foreclosed as a mortgage.
Id. (summarizing OHIO REV. CODE §§ 5313.01–5313.10).
196 Compare Mitchell v. Streets (In re Streets & Beard Farm P’ship), 882 F.2d 233, 235 (7th Cir. 1989)
(citing Shay v. Penrose, 185 N.E.2d 218 (Ill. 1962)), with O’Brien v. Ravenswood Apartments, Ltd. (In re
Ravenswood Apartments, Ltd.), 338 B.R. 307, 312–13 (6th Cir. B.A.P. 2006) (citing Coggshal v. Marine Bank
Co., 57 N.E. 1086, 1088 (Ohio 1900)).
197 In re Streets & Beard Farm, 882 F.2d at 235 (citing Shay v. Penrose, 185 N.E.2d 218 (Ill. 1962)).
198 Id.
199 In re Ravenswood Apartments, 338 B.R. at 311–13 (citing Coggshal, 57 N.E. at 1088).
200 Id., 338 B.R. at 311–13 (citing Terrell v. Albaugh (In re Terrell), 892 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1989)
(applying Michigan law)).
201 In re Ravenswood Apartments, 338 B.R. at 314–16.
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consistency in the application of federal bankruptcy law to state substantive
laws. The differences in various state installment land contract laws are a
matter of degree of the extent to which state laws focus on the contractual or
property aspect of installment land contracts.202 Even if Illinois gives
purchasers a little more rights than does Ohio, that small difference should not
be the determining factor of the applicability of § 365. Moreover, ruling one
way or another in purchaser bankruptcy for § 365 purposes brings drastically
disparate consequences to the parties to the installment land contract, which
suggest that a malleable § 365 analysis is not appropriate.203 The inconsistency
issue is most pronounced when courts follow the Countryman Approach, and
the Functional Approach would likely provide more consistent results
regarding installment land contracts in purchaser bankruptcy.204 However,
courts have not adopted the Functional Approach as the sole test for the
applicability of § 365, and many courts still adhere to the Countryman
Approach.205
B. The Mortgage Presumption in Purchaser Bankruptcy
Although applying § 365 is often incompatible with installment land
contracts in purchaser bankruptcy, categorically denying the application of
§ 365 to installment land contracts would judicially abolish the utility of some
installment land contract arrangements. A rebuttable mortgage presumption
would preserve the utility of installment land contracts and avoid the
uncomfortable feeling of ignoring the word “executory.” The presumption
would have the benefit of allowing courts to consistently analyze installment
land contracts while still retaining the flexibility to characterize them as
executory contracts in certain cases.
Although some commentators argue for the demise of installment land
contracts, state laws have not abolished installment land contracts.206 State
legislatures or courts may reduce or even remove the distinction between an
installment land contract and a mortgage in the future. However, until then,
installment land contracts currently remain a viable alternative to mortgages,
even in jurisdictions that do not favor installment land contracts, and
202

See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
See discussion supra Part I.B.2–3.
204 See generally Westbrook, supra note 79.
205 3 COLLIER, supra note 65, ¶ 365.02[2][a].
206 See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, § 3.38; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
(MORTGAGES) § 3.4 (1997).
203

OF

PROP.

LEE GALLEYS3

2013]

6/27/2013 1:58 PM

INSTALLMENT LAND CONTRACTS

455

bankruptcy courts should find the best way to address them. The mortgage
presumption will produce a pro-purchaser result in installment land contracts
in purchaser bankruptcy. Considering the functional role of an installment land
contract as a mortgage alternative, such a pro-purchaser result is desirable.207
The best resolution for the current uncertainty in installment land contract
jurisprudence would be for Congress to enact specific provisions addressing
the rights of the parties to an installment land contract.208 Congress could adopt
a provision granting more explicit rights to purchasers while keeping the
treatment of installment land contracts equitable for the sellers in purchaser
bankruptcy.209 In the meantime, courts should address installment land
contracts and the rights of the parties in a consistent manner.
1. The Function of Installment Land Contracts
One of the most important policies underlying bankruptcy law is the choice
of substance over form through courts’ use of equitable power.210 Courts
should look into the function of an installment land contract just as when
courts perform the true lease analysis in bankruptcy211 to determine if applying
the § 365 analysis is appropriate for the contract.
If a court rightly first asks whether an installment land contract functions
like a security device, the answer will be yes for the majority of cases in which
installment land contracts resemble mortgages. Even in the cases where the
courts found the installment land contract was executory, the courts have noted
that the installment land contract did function like a security device.212 The
courts just prioritized applying the material breach test over relying on the
functionality of the installment land contract.213 Therefore, the most
straightforward reason for the mortgage presumption is that an installment land

207

15 POWELL, supra note 7, § 84D.01[1].
Westbrook, supra note 79, at 321.
209 For example, Congress can adopt purchaser remedies similar to what is provided in § 365(i) and (j),
where the purchaser can only keep the property if the purchaser is in possession. 11 U.S.C. § 365(i), (j) (2006).
Also, similar to some state laws, Congress may distinguish between commercial and residential properties or
limit purchaser protections to purchasers who have paid substantial payments. See supra note 129.
210 In re Booth, 19 B.R. 53, 58 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (noting that a bankruptcy court should choose
substance over form as a court of equity).
211 See supra text accompanying notes 169–71.
212 O’Brien v. Ravenswood Apartments, Ltd. (In re Ravenswood Apartments, Ltd.), 338 B.R. 307, 315
(6th Cir. B.A.P. 2006) (citing Terrell v. Albaugh (In re Terrell), 892 F.2d 469, 472 (6th Cir.1989)).
213 Id. (citing In re Terrell, 892 F.2d at 472).
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contract functions like a mortgage in terms of the financial arrangement of the
parties and the purchaser’s control and possession of the property.
2. Lack of Benefit to the Estate in the Executory Contract Characterization
Generally, § 365 rejection can be a powerful tool for the trustee to pick and
choose favorable contracts.214 Because § 365 rejection can be so powerful,
some scholars focus on the abuse of § 365 rejection as a pseudo avoidance
power and its inequitable results for non-debtors.215 The effect of applying
§ 365 to a contract depends on what the debtor would like to do. If the debtor
wants to breach the contract, applying § 365 is better for the debtor since the
non-debtor’s remedy is generally limited to damages for a rejection under
§ 365.216 If the debtor wants to keep the contract, not applying § 365 is better
for the debtor because the non-debtor’s priority status will not be elevated to
administrative status.217 Often, the estate benefits little by assuming a contract
under § 365 because it can be overly burdensome to the estate.218 The most
utility comes from the power to reject unfavorable contracts using § 365.219
However, § 365 rejection is not a good tool for an installment land contract
purchaser for several reasons. First, § 365 rejection may not allow the
purchaser to capture any equity unless state foreclosure law applies to the
defaulted installment land contract. If no state law protection exists, the only
way to capture any equity is to assume the contract and burden the estate with
administrative costs to the unsecured creditors’ detriment. Second, even when
the contract price exceeds the fair market value of the property, assumption
may be better for the estate—depending on the past payments, the extent to
which the contract price exceeds the fair market value, and the enforcement of
the contract terms in the jurisdiction. Third, since the purchaser’s obligations
are usually only pecuniary, the exclusion of specific performance in § 365
rejection is not useful for the purchaser in bankruptcy. Thus, characterizing an

214 See, e.g., In re Taylor, 103 B.R. 511, 516–17 (D.N.J. 1989) (rejection of personal services contract); In
re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 261 B.R. 103, 117–18 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001) (“[T]he ability to reject an
executory contract is rooted in . . . maximizing the return . . . by permitting the debtor in possession to
renounce title to and abandon burdensome property.”).
215 See, e.g., Andrew, supra note 79, at 901–31; Westbrook, supra note 80, at 470–72; Westbrook, supra
note 79, at 309–10.
216 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (2006); discussion supra Part I.B.2.
217 See 3 COLLIER, supra note 65, ¶ 365.03[2]; see discussion supra Section I.B.2.
218 Andrew, supra note 79, at 890.
219 Supra note 214.
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installment land contract as an executory contract favors the assumption of the
contract while the rejection confers little benefit to the estate.
The executory contract inquiry is appropriate for contracts in general
because the benefit of the § 365 rejection power makes up for the possibility of
having to assume some contracts. Depending on contractual arrangements and
facts of the case, some debtor parties may benefit from § 365 rejection, and
others may have to burden the estate through § 365 assumption. Overall, the
impact of § 365 on debtors in general is net positive or at least net neutral.
However, as mentioned above, there is little benefit from applying § 365 to an
installment land contract in purchaser bankruptcy because of its nature. Section
365 does not provide a potential upside (i.e., the typical benefits from § 365
rejection) for a typical installment land contract purchaser in bankruptcy, while
it puts the bankrupt purchaser in a difficult position. Therefore, applying § 365
to an installment land contract in purchaser bankruptcy when there is a
substantively sound rationale to treat the contract as a secured claim would be
wholly burdensome to the purchaser. The mortgage presumption would allow
the parties to reliably predict their rights and relieve the purchaser-debtor from
the burden of proving that an installment land contract is not an executory
contract.
3. State Substantive Law Providing the Maximum Limit to the Non-DebtorSellers’ Rights
State substantive law should prescribe the maximum rights the non-debtor
party has in bankruptcy because the non-debtor party should not enjoy a
windfall from the debtor’s bankruptcy.220 Inequitable treatment of purchasers
under state law need not result in inequitable application of bankruptcy law.221
There is one commonality among the various states’ installment land contract
jurisprudence: installment land contract sellers have rights greater than or
equal to the rights of purchase money mortgagees.222 For the rehabilitation or
fresh start of the insolvent debtor, it is inevitable that some state-given rights of
the non-debtors would be diminished.223 By treating installment land contracts
as mortgages in purchaser bankruptcy, the seller’s rights would be somewhat
220

See Westbrook, supra note 79, at 249.
Countryman, supra note 68, at 473 (noting that the vender-purchaser inequity is not resulting from the
bankruptcy law, but the inequitable state law, which may be overcome by the bankruptcy court’s equitable
power).
222 See discussion supra Part I.A.1.
223 See Westbrook, supra note 79, at 249–52.
221
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diminished. By limiting the seller’s rights in the purchaser’s bankruptcy, the
purchaser incidentally enjoys more rights than he would have outside of
bankruptcy because of the complementary nature of the rights and obligations
of the sellers and purchasers. However, such result is inevitable because it is
the purchaser’s bankruptcy after all, and the typical condition of the purchaser
to be in bankruptcy is that the purchaser cannot fulfill its obligations or is
otherwise distressed.
Pro-seller laws of certain states need not translate to enhanced seller rights
in purchaser bankruptcy. State substantive laws may generally grant more
rights and protections for installment land contract sellers than mortgagees.224
However, states do not and cannot grant special protections to non-debtorsellers—as compared to non-debtor-mortgagees—under federal bankruptcy
law.225 States’ property and contract laws may allow for a middle ground
between a lease and a mortgage and let sellers enjoy the enhanced status under
state law.226 However, where there is no middle ground between a contract and
a mortgage as in purchaser bankruptcy, states cannot extend this enhanced
status to sellers.
Treating an installment land contract as an executory contract is
problematic because the executory contract treatment favors the assumption of
the contract.227 If an installment land contract is treated as an executory
contract under the Code, and that contract is assumed, the seller may enjoy
more rights than guaranteed by some state’s law.228 In some instances, the
seller may even enjoy more rights than the purported lessor of a lease that is a
disguised security device.229 On the other hand, treating an installment land
contract as a mortgage may reduce the seller’s state-given rights. However, the
seller cannot claim unjust treatment when he is equated to a mortgagee in
purchaser bankruptcy, because under state law, he is not entitled to immunity
from purchaser bankruptcy or administrative priority status under § 507.230

224 15 POWELL, supra note 7, § 84D.01[2]; Juliet M. Moringiello, A Mortgage by Any Other Name: A Plea
for the Uniform Treatment of Installment Land Contracts and Mortgages Under the Bankruptcy Code, 100
DICK. L. REV. 733 (1996).
225 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (the Supremacy Clause).
226 See supra text accompanying notes 38–51.
227 See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
228 Once the trustee decides to assume the installment land contract, the estate has to pay the full contract
payment on time. See 3 COLLIER, supra note 65, ¶ 365.03[3]. Outside of bankruptcy, depending on the state’s
law, the seller may not get full on-time performance if the purchaser defaults on the contract.
229 See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
230 See 3 COLLIER, supra note 65, ¶ 365.LH[1].
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Therefore, the seller may enter an installment land contract with the sense
of receiving better protection under state law, but such protection need not be
recognized under federal bankruptcy law. The non-debtor seller should not
assume to enjoy something more than mortgagees in mortgagor bankruptcy
because the additional rights the seller may have under state law is only the
maximum—not the guarantee—of the rights a non-debtor may get in
bankruptcy.
4. Compatibility with the Provisions in § 365(i) and (j) in Seller
Bankruptcy
There are practical and legal differences between purchaser bankruptcy and
seller bankruptcy, and the mortgage presumption would not frustrate the
understanding of § 365(i) and (j). The Bankruptcy Act of 1938 treated
installment land contracts as executory contracts in seller bankruptcy, and a
series of cases allowed the bankrupt sellers to reject the contract.231 Such
inequitable results have prompted active discussions regarding purchaser’s
rights in seller bankruptcy,232 and Congress responded by adding § 365(i) and
(j) into the Code.233 Despite the seller’s rejection under § 365, the purchaser’s
possession is protected under those provisions and the purchaser will receive
credit for the past payments. However, § 365 does not specifically address the
case of purchaser bankruptcy.234
If an installment land contract is treated as a mortgage in purchaser
bankruptcy, the purchaser would enjoy protections provided to mortgagors
under state law, while the seller would not be entitled to forfeiture or liquidated

231

See, e.g., In re N.Y. Investors Mut. Grp., 143 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
See generally Lacy, supra note 1; Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, The Installment Land
Contract—A National Viewpoint, 1977 BYU L. REV. 541.
233 11 U.S.C. § 365(i), (j) (2006).
234 Some courts have argued that the existence of § 365(i) and (j) should be viewed as congressional
acknowledgement that installment land contracts are executory under the Code. Shaw v. Dawson (In re Shaw),
48 B.R. 857, 860 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1985). But see In re Booth, 19 B.R. 53, 62–63 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
However, that inference fails to acknowledge the language, legislative history, and policy behind § 365.
Section 365(i) provides for the purchaser in possession “[i]f the trustee rejects an executory contract . . . for the
sale of real property.” 11 U.S.C. § 365(i) (emphasis added). By specifying “executory contract,” the language
suggests not all sales of real property involve an executory contract. See In re Booth, 19 B.R. at 62 n.19.
Moreover, Congress’s intent was to correct the inequity in In re New York Investors, where the bankrupt seller
rejected the land sale contract. Heartline Farms, Inc. v. Daly, 128 B.R. 246, 251 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1990), aff’d,
934 F.2d 985 (8th Cir. 1991); see also supra note 129 (describing In re New York Investors). To infer that
Congress intended all installment land contracts to be treated as executory is reading too much into this
provision regarding seller bankruptcy.
232
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damages.235 However, in seller bankruptcy, the seller has more rights than a
mortgagee because it can reject the contract if the purchaser is not in
possession.236 In addition, if the title is encumbered at the time of bankruptcy,
the purchaser-in-possession takes the risk of receiving the imperfect title if he
decides to complete the installment land contract payments.237
Therefore, treating an installment land contract as a mortgage in purchaser
bankruptcy may result in apparently inconsistent rights between the parties to
an installment land contract. This apparent inconsistency, however, does not
present a problem. The seller-debtor only enjoys enhanced rights over a
mortgagee-creditor because the seller is in bankruptcy.238 That the seller-debtor
enjoys certain rights in its own bankruptcy does not mean that those same
rights should be given to the seller-creditor if the purchaser files bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy inherently affords the debtor extra rights and protections. Although
bankruptcy should not disturb the state-given substantive rights,239 if some
disturbance is necessary or inevitable, courts should direct any resulting
leniency or advantage to the debtor—and in turn, the estate—not a creditor.240
Another way to look at the provisions of § 365(i) and (j) is to note that they
protect the purchaser of the installment land contract even though he is not the
one in bankruptcy and not the subject of the bankruptcy protection. Some
courts have interpreted § 365(i) and (j)’s purpose as providing protection to the
nonbankrupt purchasers-in-possession, not categorically defining installment
land contracts as executory contracts.241 Indirectly, these provisions show the
incompatibility of § 365 and installment land contracts. The fact that Congress
provided protections even for non-debtor-purchasers evidences Congress’s
acknowledgement of the uniquely vulnerable purchaser rights that are subject
to analysis under § 365 and in bankruptcy in general.

235

11 U.S.C. § 506; see also 4 COLLIER, supra note 65, ¶ 506.01.
11 U.S.C. § 365(i).
237 The damages to the non-debtor-purchaser can only be offset up to the amount of future payments due
under the contract.
238 See In re Booth, 19 B.R. at 62 n.19.
239 See Butner v. U.S., 440 U.S. 48, 54–55 (1979).
240 Although § 365(i) and (j) of the Code recognizes the hybrid nature of installment land contracts, this
recognition should not be interpreted to the detriment of the bankrupt purchaser when the statute is silent on
purchaser bankruptcy. See supra text accompanying note 212.
241 In re Booth, 19 B.R. at 56.
236
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III. POSSIBLE REBUTTAL OF THE MORTGAGE PRESUMPTION
Practically speaking, the mortgage presumption would capture most
installment land contract arrangements. However, there can be exceptions.
Several state statutes and § 365(i) and (j) provide useful guidance as to when it
may be appropriate not to treat an installment land contract as a mortgage.
There can be several factors in equity that may rebut the mortgage
presumption. For example, if the bankrupt purchaser is not in possession of the
property under an installment land contract, the purchaser-debtor may not have
sufficient grounds to assert treatment as a mortgage based on equity.
If the presumption is rebutted, although a rebuttal is unlikely in many
cases, a court can determine whether the installment land contract is executory
according to the executory contract jurisprudence.242 Rebutting the mortgage
presumption would require a highly fact-specific determination based on two
considerations: functionality and equity.
A. Functionality Considerations
The mortgage presumption could be rebutted if the installment land
contract does not function as a mortgage at all or the parties’ intent against
creating a mortgage is clear and express. One of the reasons for the mortgage
presumption is that an installment land contract often functionally resembles a
seller-financed purchase money mortgage.243 Because an installment land
contract is more analogous to a mortgage than a lease, analyzing an installment
land contract should begin from the mortgage end of the spectrum rather than
the lease or earnest money contract end.244 However, if an installment land
contract lacks the characteristic functions of a purchase money mortgage, the
relative rights of the seller or purchaser may not be similar to a mortgagee or
mortgagor, respectively.
There are several factors that may suggest the mortgage presumption of an
installment land contract should be rebutted. Some factors may show the
installment land contract functions not as a mortgage but as a different device.
For example, the purchaser’s failure to exercise ownership of the premises or a

242 See discussion supra Part I.B.2. The general executory contract jurisprudence encompasses a variety of
contracts and not just installment land contracts. The analysis of the executory contract jurisprudence with
respect to which approach to adopt, Countryman or Functional, is outside the scope of this Comment.
243 15 POWELL, supra note 7, § 84D.01[2].
244 See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
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balloon payment at the end of the contract term may suggest the installment
land contract is more akin to a lease or a lease-and-purchase. On the other
hand, a substantially short payment term, one or two years as opposed to
twenty years, may suggest that the installment land contract functions as an
earnest money contract.245 A lack of immediate possession may suggest the
contract does not function as a security device.
Other factors may also suggest that the parties intended the installment land
contract to be a strict contractual arrangement. The instrument itself may
indicate the parties’ intent. For instance, the installment land contract may
include the parties’ obligation to construct buildings or deliver goods and
services not typical of a mortgage arrangement.246 Or, perhaps the contract
reflects detailed negotiations between sophisticated parties whose intent is
clearly reflected in the document and should be honored. In those cases, the
clear intent of the parties would strengthen the argument for treating the
installment land contracts as executory contracts and making the bankrupt
purchaser assume or reject the contract as is.
B. Equity Considerations
In certain cases, it may be inequitable for the seller to treat the installment
land contract as a mortgage. For example, if the purchaser paid only the first
few installments and willfully defaulted to try to take advantage of the
mortgage presumption of bankruptcy law in bad faith, it may be equitable to
rebut the mortgage presumption and apply § 365. The mortgage treatment
would be especially inequitable if the seller has been a party in good faith.
Unencumbered title and fair installment land contract price may indicate the
seller’s genuine and good faith in entering the deal.247
Sometimes it may be equitable for the bankrupt purchaser to consider the
installment land contract as executory. Although this possibility is not likely,
the purchaser may show that it is more beneficial to the estate if the installment
land contract is treated as an executory contract. Perhaps the fair market value
of the property has risen, and assuming the contract may result in benefit to the
estate that somehow outweighs the burden of the contract’s elevated

245

Id.
See, e.g., Sipes v. Atl. Gulf Cmtys. (In re Gen. Dev. Corp.) 84 F.3d 1364 (11th Cir. 1996) (seller
bankruptcy).
247 Due to the financial risk the seller takes, property under an installment land contract may be
overpriced.
246
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administrative status. In such case, a court can exercise its discretion to find
that the mortgage presumption is rebutted.
In sum, although there should be a strong presumption that an installment
land contract is a mortgage in purchaser bankruptcy, courts, using their
equitable powers, may decide that the presumption has been rebutted. A
rebuttal would be appropriate if the installment land contract does not function
like a mortgage at all, the mortgage presumption would be highly inequitable
for the seller, or the executory contract characterization would greatly benefit
the purchaser’s bankruptcy estate.
CONCLUSION
An installment land contract by its nature is a hybrid instrument embodying
unclear state-given contractual and property rights. In addressing installment
land contracts in purchaser bankruptcy, courts have asked whether installment
land contracts are executory contracts under § 365.248 To determine whether
§ 365 applies to installment land contracts, courts have consulted state property
laws in conjunction with the executory contract inquiry—either the
Countryman Approach (the material breach test) or the Functional Approach
(the benefit to the estate). However, the “executory contract” inquiry has
resulted in distortion of the parties’ property rights and inconsistent
applications of bankruptcy law by courts, and has illustrated the lack of utility
of § 365 for installment land contract purchasers. Therefore, instead of
applying § 365, courts should presume that an installment land contract in
purchaser bankruptcy is a mortgage. The presumption may be rebutted when
the installment land contract does not function as a mortgage or when it is
inequitable to characterize the installment land contract as a mortgage.
The best way to resolve the ambiguities in installment land contract
jurisprudence would be for Congress to directly address installment land
contracts in purchaser bankruptcy in the Code. Some commentators argue that
installment land contracts should be abolished since they have few independent

248 Terrell v. Albaugh (In re Terrell), 892 F.2d 469 (6th Cir.1989) (finding the contract executory);
Mitchell v. Streets (In re Streets & Beard Farm P’ship), 882 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding the contract not
executory); O’Brien v. Ravenswood Apartments, Ltd. (In re Ravenswood Apartments, Ltd.), 338 B.R. 307
(6th Cir. B.A.P. 2006) (finding the contract executory); Heartline Farms, Inc. v. Daly, 128 B.R. 246 (Bankr. D.
Neb. 1990) (finding the contract not executory), aff’d, 934 F.2d 985 (8th Cir. 1991); In re Speck, 50 B.R. 307
(Bankr. D.S.D. 1985) (finding the contract executory), aff’d, 798 F.2d 279 (8th Cir. 1986); Shaw v. Dawson
(In re Shaw), 48 B.R. 857 (D.N.M. 1985) (finding the contract executory).

LEE GALLEYS3

464

6/27/2013 1:58 PM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 29

merits.249 However, without clear congressional action or changes in state
property laws regarding installment land contracts, courts and practitioners are
left with the current state of the law. The rebuttable mortgage presumption
would not offend state property laws and would provide clarity and
consistency in analyzing installment land contracts in purchaser bankruptcy.
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